Abstract-This paper proposes Functional Analysis attacks on state of the art Logic Locking algorithms (FALL attacks). FALL attacks use structural and functional analyses of locked circuits to identify the locking key. In contrast to past work, FALL attacks can often (90% of successful attempts in our experiments) fully defeat locking by only analyzing the locked netlist, without oracle access to an activated circuit. Experiments show that FALL attacks succeed against 65 out of 80 (81%) of circuits locked using Secure Function Logic Locking (SFLL), the only combinational logic locking algorithm resilient to all known attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization of the semiconductor supply chain has resulted in IC design houses becoming increasingly reliant on potentially untrustworthy offshore foundries. This reliance has raised the spectre of integrated circuit (IC) piracy, unauthorized overproduction, and malicious design modifications by adversarial entities that may be part of these contract foundries [4, 7, 19] . These concerns have both financial [5] and national security implications [14] .
A potential solution to these problems is logic locking [1, 11] : a set of techniques that introduce additional logic and new inputs to a digital circuit in order to create a "locked" version of it. The locked circuit operates correctly if and only if the new inputs -called "key inputs" and typically connected to a tamper-proof memory -are set to the right values. The circuit is activated by programming the correct key values after manufacturing and prior to sale. The security assumption underlying logic locking is that the untrusted foundry does not know the correct key inputs and cannot compute it.
Initial proposals for logic locking did not satisfy this assumption and were vulnerable to attack [8, 9, 17, 23, 26] . Rajendran et al. [9] used automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) algorithms to reveal the key bits. Subramanyan et al. [17] developed the SAT attack which defeated all combinational logic locking algorithms known at the time. The attack uses a Boolean satisfiability solver to iteratively find inputs that distinguish between equivalence classes of keys. For each such input, an activated IC (perhaps purchased from the market) is queried for the correct output. This is fed back to the SAT solver to compute the next distinguishing input. The practicality of this attack depends on the number of equivalence classes of keys present in the locked circuit.
Much subsequent work has focused on SAT-attack resilient logic locking [20, 21, 24, 27, 28] that ensures the number of equivalence classes of keys is exponential in the key length. Broadly speaking, these proposals all share the structure shown in Figure 1 . They introduce a circuit which "flips" the output of the original circuit for a particular cube or set of cubes. We refer to this component as the cube stripping unit. This flipped output is then inverted by a key-dependent circuit that we refer to as the progammable functionality restoration unit. This latter circuit is guaranteed to have an exponential number of equivalence classes of keys and ensures SAT attack resilience. (Note these methods "hard code" the locking key in the cube stripping unit which leads to a vulnerability that we exploit.) Initial proposals along these lines were Anti-SAT [20, 21] and SARLock [24] . However, Anti-SAT was vulnerable to the signal probability skew (SPS) attack [24] while SARLock was vulnerable to the Double DIP attack [13] and the Approximate SAT attack [12] . Both schemes are vulnerable to removal and bypass attacks [22, 25] . Subsequently, Yasin et al. proposed TTLock [28] and Secure Function Logic Locking (SFLL) [27] . To the best of our knowledge, SFLL is the only combinational logic locking scheme resilient to all of the above attacks.
A. Contributions
In this paper, we introduce a novel class of attacks: Functional Analysis attacks on Logic Locking, abbreviated FALL attacks. FALL attacks defeat locking methods which use cube stripping and programmable functionality restoration.
Our approach is to identify sub-circuits corresponding to the cube stripping module, and then extract the key using functional analysis of these nodes. This is challenging for two reasons. First, testing whether a sub-circuit is equivalent to the cube stripping function for some key value is a Quantified Boolean Formula (QBF) instance. Note QBF solving is PSPACE-complete and so direct encoding to QBF does not scale. We tackle this by introducing a set of polynomial time structural analyses that identify the cube stripping unit.
The second challenge is extracting the key from the cube stripping unit. For this, we prove novel Boolean functional properties of the cube stripping function for TTLock and SFLL and introduce SAT-based analyses that determine locking keys using these properties. These structural and functional analyses defeat SFLL, which to the best of our knowledge, is the only combinational locking method resilient to all known attacks.
We present a thorough experimental analysis of FALL attacks. The attacks succeed on 65 out of 80 benchmark circuits (81%) in our evaluation. Among these 65, our attacks shortlist exactly one key for 58 circuits (90% of successful attempts). This shows FALL attacks are extremely practical to carry out as they do not even require Oracle access to an unlocked IC.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section describes the adversary model for the FALL attack and the notation used in the rest of this paper.
A. Adversary Model
Our adversary is a malicious foundry with layout and mask information. The gate level netlist can be reverse engineered from this [18] . The adversary knows the locking algorithm, associated parameters and can distinguish between key inputs and circuit inputs. We follow [9, 17, 27] etc. and restrict our attention to combinational circuits. 1 The above assumptions are standard and in both logic locking defenses and attacks [9-13, 17, 20, 24, 27, 28] . We depart from past work in one important way. We do not assume that the adversary has access to an activated circuit which can be used to observe the output for a specific input, ruling out Oracle-guided attacks [9, 12, 13, 17] . This makes FALL attacks more practical than past work while also being more successful on SAT-resistant locking schemes.
B. Notation B = {0, 1} is the Boolean domain. A combinational logic circuit is modeled as a directed acyclic graph G = (V, E).
Nodes in the graph correspond to logic gates and input nodes. 
The support of a node, denoted by Supp(v), is the set of all nodes v j such that v j ∈ TFC(v) and #fanins(v j ) = 0. In a locked netlist, define the predicate isKey(v) such that isKey(v) = 1 iff node v is a key input. Given two bit
) to be their Hamming distance (⊕ is the eXclusive OR operator). Given a Boolean function f : B n → B, the function obtained by setting
III. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS ATTACKS
This section describes FALL attacks. We first describe structural analyses to identify nodes that may be the output of the cube stripping unit. We then develop functional properties of the cube stripping function used in SFLL and develop algorithms based on these attacks. Due to a lack of space, the descriptions below are terse. More detailed explanations can be found in the associated technical report [16] .
A. Identifying the Cube Stripping Unit
The first step in identifying the cube stripping unit is comparator identification. This finds all nodes in the circuit which are the result of comparing an input value with a key input. These nodes are likely to be part of the functionality restoration unit. This is done by identifying all gates v i whose circuit function is equivalent to (z ⊕ x i ) ⇐⇒ k i for some z. Here x i is a circuit input, k i must be a key input and z captures whether k i is being compared with x i or ¬x i . The result of comparator identification is the set
The set of all input nodes x i that appear in Comp should be the support of the cube stripping unit. Given the set
The set Cand is set of all gates whose support is identical to
This set of gates contains the output of the cube stripping unit.
B. Functional Properties of Cube Stripping
Cube stripping involves the choice of a protected cube, represented by the tuple K c = k 1 , . . . , k m where m = |Comp| and k i ∈ B. A stripping function strip :
is parameterized by this protected cube. The output of the functionality stripped circuit (the dashed box in Figure 1 ) is inverted for the input X = x 1 , . . . , x m when strip(K c )(X) = 1. For a given locked circuit and associated key value, the value of K c is "hard-coded" into the implementation of strip. The attacker's goal is to learn K c .
In this paper we study functional properties of the following cube stripping function: strip h (K c )(X) . = HD(K c , X) = h. strip h flips the output for input patterns exactly Hamming distance h from the protected cube k 1 , . . . , k m . This is the cube stripping function for SFLL-HD h and the special case of h = 0 corresponds to the cube stripping function for TTLock. This function has three specific properties that can be exploited to determine the value of K c . 3 . This is positive unate in x 1 as 0 ≤ ¬x 2 ∧ x 3 , and negative unate in x 2 as 0 ≤ x 1 ∧ x 3 . Algorithm ANALYZEUNATENESS: Lemma 1 leads to the following attack on SFLL-HD 0 . Check if the circuit function of a node c ∈ Cand , cktfn(c), is unate in all of its inputs. If so, a potential locking key K c is obtained using Lemma 1. Finally, verify that the cktfn(c) ⇐⇒ strip 0 (K c )(X) is valid.
1) Unateness (TTLock/SFLL-HD
i = 0. Let k 1 , k 2 , k 3 = 1, 0, 1 . strip 0 (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 )(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) = x 1 ∧ ¬x 2 ∧ x
2) Non-Overlapping Errors Property (SFLL-HD h ):
In the definition of strip h , let K c = k 1 , . . . , k 4 = 1, 1, 1, 1 and h = 1. Consider the two input values X 1 = 1, 1, 1, 0 and
and X 2 are Hamming distance 2 from each other and distance 1 from K c . This means that the values of x i on which the two patterns agree -x 2 and x 3 -must be equal to k 2 and k 3 respectively. The "errors" (bit-positions where
and X 2 cannot overlap as they are Hamming distance 2h apart. Generalizing this observation leads to the following result.
Algorithm DISTANCE2H: An attack algorithm based on Lemma 2 is applicable when 4h ≤ m; m being the number of key inputs. Given a node c ∈ Cand , we use a SAT solver to find two satisfying assignments of cktfn(c) that are Hamming distance 2h apart. This determines m − 2h key bits in K c . Next, we constrain the 2h input variables which were different among these two assignments to be identical and find another pair of satisfying assignments Hamming distance 2h apart. This yields the remaining key bits in K c . The final step is checking whether cktfn(c) ⇐⇒ strip h (K c )(X) is valid.
3) Sliding Window Property (SFLL-HD h ):
Let us revisit the example from the non-overlapping errors property. Let K c = k 1 , . . . , k 4 = 1, 1, 1, 1 and h = 1. For the input value
. This is because x 2 4 = k 4 , so the remaining bits in X 2 must be equal to K c so that strip 1 (K c )(X 2 ) = 1. But this forces the Hamming distance between X 1 and X 2 to be 0 (and not 2 as desired). This observation leads to the following result.
Algorithm SLIDINGWINDOW: Lemmas 2 and 3 lead to an attack on SFLL-HD h for h < m/2 where m is the number of key inputs. Given a node c ∈ Cand , we use a SAT solver
are also equal to k j by Lemma 2. The remaining bits in K c are determined by iterated application of Lemma 3.
IV. EVALUATION
This section describes our experimental evaluation of FALL attacks. We describe the evaluation methodology, then present the results of the functional analyses. We evaluated FALL attacks on MCNC and ISCAS'85 benchmarks circuits, details of which are shown in Table I . We intentionally select smaller circuits to stress test the locking algorithms -a locking algorithm that only claims security for large circuits cannot be considered secure. We implemented the TTLock and SFLL locking algorithms for varying values of the Hamming distance parameter h and maximum key size of 128 bits. Locked netlists were optimized using ABC v1.01 [6] to minimize any structural bias introduced by our locking implementation. The circuit analyses were implemented in Python and use the Lingeling SAT Solver [3] . Attack source code is available at [15] .
A. Methodology
Our experiments were conducted on the CentOS Linux distribution version 7.2 running on 28-core Intel R Xeon R Platinum 8180 ("SkyLake") Server CPUs. Algorithms were run with a time limit of 1000 seconds. The DISTANCE2H attack defeats all SFLL-HD h locked circuits for h = m/8 and h = m/4 . We repeated this experiment for the seven largest circuits with a key size of 128 bits and the DISTANCE2H attack defeated all of these locked circuits. ANALYZEUNATENESS is able to defeat 18 out of 20 SFLL-HD 0 /TTLock circuits. SLIDINGWINDOW is able to defeat all locked circuits for h = m/8 , but does not perform as well for larger values of h. This is because the SAT calls for larger values of h are computationally harder as they involve more adder gates in the Hamming Distance computation. In summary, 65 out of 80 circuits (81%) are defeated by at least one FALL attack.
B. Results
Among these 65 circuits for which the attack is successful, a unique key is identified for 58 circuits (90%). This means 58 out of 80 circuits were fully defeated without oracle access. Among the seven circuits for which multiple keys were shortlisted, the attack shortlists two keys which are bitwise complements of each other for four circuits, three keys are shortlisted for two other circuits. One corner cases occurs for c432: 36 keys are shortlisted, this is still a huge reduction from the initial space of 2 36 possible keys.
C. Discussion
Our results reinforce the observation that all logic locking schemes appear to be vulnerable to attack. We assert this is because the logic locking community has not adopted notions of provable security from cryptography. For instance, consider an adaptation of indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) [2] to logic locking. In this game, the adversary picks two different circuits and the defender encrypts one of them with a random key. The adversary wins if they can determine which of the two circuits was encrypted. It is easy to see that the adversary always wins this game for SFLL-HD h as the original circuit is largely unchanged by locking. To the best of our knowledge, the adversary would win the game described above for all logic locking schemes proposed so far. Truly secure logic locking will need the development of a methodology that can win this game.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper introduced Functional Analysis attacks on state of the art Logic Locking algorithms (FALL attacks). FALL attacks use structural and functional analyses of locked circuits to identify the locking key. Experiments showed that FALL attacks succeeded against 65 out of 80 (81%) of circuits locked using Secure Function Logic Locking (SFLL), the only combinational locking algorithm resilient to all known attacks. In contrast to past work, FALL attacks often (90% of successful attempts) fully defeat SFLL even without oracle access to an unlocked circuit, implying that logic locking attacks may be much easier to carry out than was previously believed.
